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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-2112 
____________ 
 
In Re:  SUMMIT METALS, INC., 
                                             Debtor 
 
AMBROSE M. RICHARDSON, III, 
                                                  Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. No. 1-09-cv-00256) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 24, 2012 
 
Before:  FISHER and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges, and JONES,*
 
 District Judge. 
(Filed: April 17, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
JONES, District Judge. 
 On May 3, 2011, Ambrose M. Richardson, III (“Appellant” or “Richardson”) filed 
a Notice of Appeal with this Court challenging the District Court of Delaware’s order 
                                              
*The Honorable John E. Jones, III, District Judge for the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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denying his appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.  
For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the order of the District Court.  Also 
pending before this Court are three separate motions to supplement the record with 
additional appendices1
I.  Factual Background 
 and a motion to file supplemental briefing.  We shall deny the 
motions to supplement, and the motion to file supplemental briefing, as our decision 
renders them moot. 
Since the findings of fact contain a detailed factual recitation, and because we 
write primarily for the parties, we shall only provide a few relevant facts as necessary 
throughout our analysis. 
II.  Procedural History 
Richardson filed a Notice of Appeal with the District Court appealing the order of 
the Bankruptcy Court entered March 4, 2009, which granted the Chapter 11 Trustee’s 
(“Appellee” or “Trustee”) Motion pursuant to Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and 
Bankruptcy Rule 9019, and approved a settlement between Francis A. Monaco, Jr., the 
Chapter 11 Liquidating Trustee, and Richard E. Gray (“Gray”).  Although the original 
claim against Gray sought an amount in excess of $40 million, the Bankruptcy Court 
ultimately approved a $100,000 settlement of the remaining claims against him.  On 
                                              
1 The three filings include:  (1) a Motion Pursuant to FRAP 10(e) filed on 
September 21, 2011; (2) Appellant’s Second Motion Pursuant to FRAP 10(e) filed on 
November 4, 2011; and (3) Appellant’s Third Motion Pursuant to FRAP 10(e) filed on 
January 24, 2012. 
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March 23, 2011, the District Court issued a memorandum and order denying the appeal 
and affirming the March 4, 2009 oral opinion of the Bankruptcy Court. 
III.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction over Richardson’s bankruptcy appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).  We have appellate jurisdiction over Richardson’s appeal 
from the District Court’s final decision pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
We review findings of fact made by the bankruptcy court for clear error, and 
review questions of law de novo.  See Lebron v. Mechem Fin. Inc., 27 F.3d 937, 942 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  Although we review de novo whether the Bankruptcy Court should have 
analyzed a settlement under the factors enunciated in In re Martin, 91 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 
1996), we review whether the approval of that settlement was proper by applying the 
abuse of discretion standard.  See In re RFE Indus. Inc., 283 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“We review de novo whether the bankruptcy court should have analyzed the Settlement 
under the Martin analysis.”); Will v. Nw. Univ. (In re Nutraquest, Inc.), 434 F.3d 639, 
644 (3d Cir. 2006) (“We review the District Court’s approval of the settlement for an 
abuse of discretion.”). 
IV.  Discussion 
Appellant raises a number of arguments in opposition to the District Court’s order 
affirming the settlement approved by the Bankruptcy Court.  However, we ultimately find 
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it necessary to address only the contention we find most compelling in determining 
whether to uphold the decision of the District Court. 
Appellant claims that, in approving the Gray settlement, the Bankruptcy Court 
failed to properly consider the factors enunciated by this Court in In re Martin for 
evaluating a settlement between an estate and an adverse party:  “(1) the probability of 
success in litigation; (2) the likely difficulties in collection; (3) the complexity of the 
litigation involved, and the expense, inconvenience and delay necessarily attending it; 
and (4) the paramount interest of the creditors.”  91 F.3d at 393.  Richardson contends the 
decision of the Bankruptcy Court was so perfunctory that it is questionable whether an 
analysis was conducted.  He also argues that the Bankruptcy Court failed to make any 
separate findings, and that it blended its discussion of the four factors to such an extent 
that its decision as to any one of them standing alone could not be distinguished from the 
other factors. 
 The Bankruptcy Court stated the following concerning the Martin factors in its 
oral ruling from the bench at the conclusion of the March 4, 2009 hearing: 
 In reviewing the factors to be applied under Martin, it seems to me really 
the complexity and likelihood of success and collectability factors are all 
tied closely together.  And there is just so much uncertainty in the pursuit of 
the collection of this judgment.  I can certainly understand the Liquidating 
Trustee’s business decision that it serves no further purpose or no further 
good purpose to expend any more estate funds in pursuit of this collection, 
even if funds were available.  Approving the settlement brings the matter, 
as has been testified, one step closer to conclusion, meaning the Chapter 11, 
and the completion of responsibilities under the plan.   
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Richardson also challenges the Bankruptcy Court’s finding that “this proposed 
settlement falls above the lowest point in the range of reasonableness and I am prepared 
to approve it,” on the grounds that the court neglected to establish a “range of 
reasonableness.”  For example, Appellant argues that notwithstanding the $5.4 million 
Gray received from the sale of Rich Realty, the settlement provided creditors with less 
than two percent of the funds allegedly available.  Richardson maintains that additional 
money could have been discovered if not for the Trustee’s failure to conduct an adequate 
investigation into the funds controlled, or that were once controlled, by Gray. 
In response, Appellee correctly notes that the standard of review for a compromise 
entered under Bankruptcy Rule 9019 is an abuse of discretion standard.  See In re 
Nutraquest, Inc., 434 F.3d at 644.  As we noted in Nutraquest, “for us to find an abuse of 
discretion the District Court’s decision must rest on a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an 
errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.”  Id. at 645 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Concerning the Martin factors, Appellee claims that the Bankruptcy Court’s oral 
opinion exhibits a thorough and thoughtful analysis of the settlement and related issues, 
including an analysis of the Martin factors, the testimony of the Liquidating Trustee, and 
the objections lodged by Richardson.  As to the first factor, Appellee emphasizes the 
Bankruptcy Court’s finding that the Trustee lacked sufficient funds, without expending 
money designated for the unsecured creditors, to pursue the Rich Realty claims.  
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Regarding the second factor, the Trustee asserts that he contracted with a private 
investigation firm to search for unencumbered assets that Gray possessed.  Concerning 
the third factor, the Trustee contends that he exercised his business judgment in 
concluding that the uncertainty surrounding collection of the remaining funds justified his 
decision to abandon the same.  Finally, as to the fourth factor, the Trustee highlights the 
Bankruptcy Court’s finding that “in Bankruptcy Court, the exercise is about maximizing 
value for the creditors.  And . . . it often involves an exercise of risk/reward of cost 
benefit, and here I am convinced that the Liquidating Trustee has made the appropriate 
cost benefit analysis.” 
 Given the deferential standard of review afforded a bankruptcy court’s approval of 
a settlement pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019, we find that the Bankruptcy Court did 
not abuse its discretion in approving the settlement and that the explanation provided, 
though abbreviated, was not deficient given the Bankruptcy Court’s extensive familiarity 
with the case over the decade that the case languished on its docket.  While we realize 
that Appellant may have desired a more thorough discussion of the Martin factors as they 
relate to the Bankruptcy Court’s approval of the settlement, the fact remains that the 
Bankruptcy Court addressed each of the factors after the issues surrounding acceptance of 
the settlement were fully briefed and argued by the parties.  See In re Martin, 91 F.3d at 
393 (noting “it is an unusual case in which there is not some litigation that is settled 
between the representative of the estate and an adverse party”). 
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Here, as to the first factor, the Bankruptcy Court recognized that the Trustee 
lacked sufficient funds to pursue the estate’s claims against Rich Realty in remarking that 
such an endeavor “it seems to me would be, based on the record that was made, a 
completely speculative undertaking.”  The Bankruptcy Court also noted that the Trustee 
had likely expended more time and money than was required in attempting to find an 
attorney or law firm to represent the creditors, on a contingency fee basis, in pursuit of 
this speculative claim.  Accordingly, it appears that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse 
its discretion in concluding that the probability of success in litigating such claims was 
low. 
Similarly, with regard to the second factor, the Bankruptcy Court determined that 
the difficulties in attempting to collect these claims far exceeded the purported benefit 
from the same.  In analyzing the third element, the expense, inconvenience, and delay 
associated with collection of the claims, the court stated “there is just so much 
uncertainty in the pursuit of the collection of this judgment” and “I can certainly 
understand the Liquidating Trustee’s business decision that it serves no further purpose or 
no further good purpose to expend any more estate funds in pursuit of this collection, 
even if funds were available.”  See In re Nutraquest, 434 F.3d at 646 (“The balancing of 
the complexity and delay of litigation with the benefits of settlement is related to the 
likelihood of success in that litigation.”). 
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Concerning the fourth element, the paramount interest of the creditors, the 
Bankruptcy Court concluded that despite some creditors’ objections to the settlement, and 
an indication some were willing to wait longer for the slightest chance of a more 
substantial recovery, “the exercise is all about maximizing value for creditors.”  As noted 
above, the District Court highlighted that “in Bankruptcy Court, the exercise is all about 
maximizing value for the creditors.  And . . . it often involves an exercise of risk/reward 
of cost benefit, and here I am convinced that the Liquidating Trustee has made the 
appropriate cost benefit analysis that further pursuit, especially in light of the possibility 
of receiving $100,000.”  Thus, we find that in approving the settlement the court, given 
its thorough knowledge of the chronology of the case, held the paramount interest of the 
creditors as its ultimate goal in reaching this decision.  Moreover, we find that to remand 
the case to the Bankruptcy Court would prove needlessly futile and would result in a 
waste of judicial resources, as the four Martin factors clearly played a prominent role in 
the court’s discussion.  While a remand might cause the Bankruptcy Court to more 
explicitly tailor its analysis to the Martin factors, we are confident that the outcome 
would remain unchanged. 
Finally, as our decision does not involve consideration of the documents Appellant 
seeks to introduce into the record through the three pending motions to supplement, we 
shall deny the motions to supplement as moot.  We shall also deny as moot Appellee’s 
Conditional Motion Pursuant to Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to 
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Permit Supplemental Briefing related to the motions to supplement.  In addition, we note 
that to the extent Appellant seeks to introduce reports, correspondence from Gray to the 
Trustee’s counsel, a letter agreement between Gray and the Trustee regarding the scope 
of the Trustee’s “due diligence,” or other exhibits that existed prior to the Bankruptcy 
Court’s ruling, such materials would have been more appropriately introduced in the first 
instance in front of the Bankruptcy Court.  At this stage of the appellate process, it is not 
our task to consider evidence that was apparently not before the Bankruptcy Court.  See 
In re Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.’s Application for Access to Sealed Transcripts, 913 F.2d 
89, 96 (3d Cir. 1990) (“This Court has said on numerous occasion that it cannot consider 
material on appeal that is outside of the district court record. . . .  In Sewak v. INS, 900 
F.2d 667, 673 (3d Cir. 1990), we stated that ‘as an appellate court we do not take 
testimony, hear evidence or determine disputed facts in the first instance.  Instead, we 
rely upon a record developed in those fora that do take evidence and find facts.’”). 
V.  Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above, we shall affirm the order of the District Court. 
